Contesting Europe as Market: German Transnational Media and David Cameron’s EU Speech

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In this essay, I analyze countervailing discourses of the European Union as exemplified by British PM David Cameron on the EU referendum and German transnational media outlets Deutsche Welle (DW) and the English edition of Der Spiegel (DS). In the context of the global financial crisis, discourses on “the meaning of Europe” indicate sites of ideological contestation. That these discourses flow through transnational media, such as DS and DW, indicate contestation at an international and elite level. Therefore, analysis of media outlets catering to European and international elites provides a window into the intellectual and discursive resources used by political leaders. Using the tools of critical discourse analysis and rhetorical theories of the creation of the “people,” I find that Cameron constructs the EU as an economic community grounded in free market relations, which in turn forecloses alternative meanings of being European and alternative solutions to Europe’s economic crisis. DW and DS coverage of Cameron’s speech, on the other hand, undermines Cameron’s vision of the EU as an exclusively economic entity. Coverage in both of these outlets, in both editorials and news stories, contextualizes Cameron’s EU policy as driven by domestic interests and as a “failure of political courage.” DW and DS’s uniformity of quote selection and editorial position indicate that both articulate alternative ways of being European. While Cameron endorses a financialized citizenship, transnational news undermines that subjecthood. These competing discourses illustrate the uneven and unsettled dimensions within financialization discourses and the potential for alternative meanings in elite transnational media.

The European Union (EU) is in a state of economic and social crisis. Trust in the EU as an institution is down to its lowest recorded levels, and nearly double what it was six years ago (Jenkins, 2013; Traynor, 2013). However, it is in times of crisis that old structures are challenged, and old cultural assumptions lose their meaning making potential. As part of his ongoing response to the crisis, British Prime Minister David Cameron delivered a speech in January 2013 in which he promised to explain his views on the European crisis and Britain’s place in the EU more generally. This speech was for more than just domestic consumption in Britain. Cameron meant to communicate with his European national peers, as well as with European citizens across the continent. The speech was a much anticipated attempt by the PM to clarify what version of the EU he endorsed, and define his vision for overcoming the crisis. Given the anticipation, media coverage was intense and transnational media, in addition to national media devoted a great deal of coverage to it. Two of those outlets come from Germany, Deutsche Welle (DW) and Der Spiegel International (DS). While neither has sustained much critical attention, they operate at the elite level of transnational media and therefore their contestation of
Cameron indicates ideological contestation of financialization discourse.

This essay proceeds by reviewing the literature on the discursive resources and cultural formations of the European Union, which European leaders can draw upon when communicating. Next, it examines the literature on transnational media, elite audiences, and European publics. Next it employs methods from constitutive rhetoric (Charland, 1987) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1989; Holborow, 2007), to analyze DW and DS’s media coverage before and after Cameron’s speech, as well as the speech itself. It finds that DS and DW undermined Cameron’s goal of a financialized EU via a discourse that infantilized Cameron and by extension nationalism.

**Financialization, Media, and Political Unions**

As financialization of the economy proceeds it also transforms states (Harvey, 2007) and ways of being and living as citizen (Allon, 2010). Under financialization “everyday life is increasingly framed as a space of investment yielding both financial and personal returns,” and, “[it] positions the individual as an investor in a life project that requires the constant pursuit of opportunities and the negotiation of risks in order to yield rewards” (Allon, 2010, p. 367). Average citizens are forced to view life as an investment opportunity leading to, “the primacy of the investor as the way to orient domestic policy and ideas of citizenship” (Martin, 2002, p. 21). There is nothing “natural” to this process (Lazzarato, 2009) and it requires, at some level, the work of interested parties to continue, political elites being one of many interlocking players who discursively constitute masses of individuals into people (Charland, 1987; Laclau, 2005; McGee, 1975).

In the European Union, financialization, and the crisis it led to, threatens to break apart the pan-European project. However, unlike singular nation-states, the EU is a collection of 28 states whose leaders are torn between maintaining the Union as an economic project while deepening political and social integration to foster an European identity (Féron, 2004; Friedman & Thiel, 2011; Gollmitzer, 2008). The project of creating a European identity is a long-term one, and it has been thrown into disarray by the Eurozone crisis. In this state of flux, the possibilities of Europe are sites of struggle between different national and supra-national elites.

**European Unions and the Media**

While the EU has been successful in preventing war between its members, conflict continues over the exact form the Union should take (Balibar, 2004; Beck & Grande, 2007; Case, 2009; Habermas, Bofinger, & Nida-Rümelin, 2012; Kennedy, 2011; Taras, 2008). Öner argues that there are, “competing visions about the European,” and as such, “There is a necessity of finding new common goals for the EU,” which, “can maintain solidarity and provide new reasons to pursue integration” (Öner, 2011, p. 11). The work of defining Europe is further compounded by a sense of “democratic deficit,” or the lack of accountability of EU institutions to citizens (de Beus, 2010; Preston & Metykova, 2009; Statham, 2008). European elites draw upon certain forms of values when they debate the desirable end point of the EU.

Just as codifying financialization requires cultural shifts, the EU’s foundational texts are encoded with European cultural values. Kennedy (2011) argues that there are four sets of values imbedded in the 2000
European Charter.* The first value is the freedom of movement for “services, goods, people, and capital.” This set of rights is the focus of those who critique the EU as a neoliberal construct (see for example: Caffrany & Ryner, 2003; Stockhammer, 2012; Storey, 2008). In the second set of values, the Union is a, “defender of human rights, dignity, and justice” (p. 27). Third, following from the preceding set, the EU is a liberal moral agent who would defend those rights. “Finally, Europe is defined with equality and solidarity,” which in turn “complicates” the possibility of a completely neoliberal Europe (p. 27). European elites draw upon these inventional (Delicath & Deluca, 2003) or members’ resources (Fairclough, 1989) to rhetorically construct and constrain the nature of European identities. These qualities function as a “cultural system” from which pro-EU elites may draw. In opposition, an anti-EU nationalist would draw upon particular national or ethnic notions. As these “values” do not always, “cumulate and reinforce the teleological sense of European integration… we might be inclined to think about the conditions of cultural elements’ complementarity and contradiction, especially through events” (Kennedy, 2011, p. 29). Put another way, these values are a set of resources upon which the EU and interested national elites, including the media, can draw. According to Taras (2008) elites will deploy a rhetoric of “supranational sacrality – a claim to the transcendence of the EU,” that surmounts national identity (p. 60).

In their attempts to craft “sacrality,” EU elites utilize their authority over communication policy. Given the EU’s general lack of legitimacy, “EU elites see better communication through national media as the best way to improve their legitimacy. Thus the EU’s institutional ‘democratic deficit’ is linked to, or partly caused by, a ‘communication deficit’” (Statham, 2008, p. 398). The European Parliament sought to fix this deficit with directives in 1989 and 2005 to facilitate media flows across borders and to create a European 24-hour news station, called Euronews (McPhail, 2010). However, because, “the launch of pan-national channels had not succeeded in de-nationalizing television in member states, there was a chance and expectation that the ‘European audiovisual space’ or a ‘Europe of viewers,’” occur through legal deregulation rather than a top down approach (Polonska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 2011, p. 514). As such most European content is national in focus and is expected to remain so (de Smaele, 2004; Polonska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 2011) leading to a particular research agenda for European media studies. Transnational Broadcasters and Elite Media

Transnational media outlets have existed for much of the 20th century. Seib (2010) observes that states attempt to harness the power of communication technologies to propagate their preferred policy narratives in the international information space. Price (2002) suggests that these media encapsulate a, “complex combination of state-sponsored news, information and entertainment,” to, “shape the opinion of the people and leaders” (p. 200). Similarly, Seib observes, “Just about everywhere in the world, there are people, particularly among the political and economic elite,” that governments desire to influence. Given their rarity, their audiences, and their stated goals, scholars often view transnational media as a poor site of inquiry into European identity (Koopmans & Erbe, 2004; Polonska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 2011). However, Davis (2003) argues that “Corporate and political elites… spend a significant amount of time targeting

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rival elites at all levels,” suggesting that, “elites are simultaneously the main sources, main targets and some of the most influenced recipients of news” (p. 673). As such, analyzing elite transnational media offers a window into elite discourse at the supranational level.

In the EU, the *Financial Times* functions as the key outlet for political and economic elites (Corcoran & Fahy, 2009), a function both DW and DS seek to emulate. Even though both DS and DW started as media directed toward Germans, both have expanded their English language offerings. Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg (2009), working from Chalaby (2002, 2005, 2009), have developed a typology of transnational news broadcasters, with high analytic value, dividing transnational media outlets into four categories: national media with a transnational mission, inter-national media, pan-regional media, and global media. Inter-national media is characterized by cooperation by two or more media outlets from different countries. Arte Media is an example, but outlets that fit into the category are relatively rare. Pan-regional media cater to definable geographic regions, with Al-Jazeera Arabic the prime example. Networks such as BBC World and CNN exemplify global media, those that reach a truly global audience. Finally, national media with a transnational mission are those networks owned and funded by a single nation, whose audience lives abroad. DW lies in between the national/transnational category and the pan-regional one. The authors observe that, “Communicating with expatriates abroad is no longer the prime purpose of Deutsche Welle” (p. 700). DW defines its own goals as improving, “‘Germany’s external media image’ and their ‘most important target groups are international opinion leaders with an interest in Germany and Europe’” (quoted in Seib, 2010, p. 738). The network opened an Arabic language channel in 2005, aimed at opinion leaders in that region (Zöllner, 2006). Furthermore, the, “channel embraced a European mission in 2004, when DW described itself as a ‘forum in Europe’. The channel’s new positioning and self-understanding is clearly reflected in its self-descriptive slogan: ‘From the Heart of Europe’” (Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg, 2009, pp. 700–701). According to managing director Christoph Lanz this, “doesn’t have to do with a small amount of Germans watching. It just has to do with the fact that the world is six billion people and there are just 80 million Germans…. If you have a mission statement to reach out to the world, then you have to reach across the language gap” (quoted in Seib, 2010, p. 738). By broadcasting in English, as well as Spanish (Silcock, 2002), DW can reach a far broader audience. As such, Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg contend that the network is moving more towards a model like that of BBC World Service and presumably is targeting a similar audience of global elites.

Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg’s typology does not include print media, but the “international” version of Der Spiegel illustrates similar concerns with language, if not necessarily of class (Schäffner, 2005; Tzortzis, 2005). DS, as a print outlet, is different from DW. However, its ostensible mission is similar. DS International, the online only English version translates the lead articles, as well as key feature articles, into English. The stated goal of the English language version to bring a, “‘unique European perspective to the English-speaking world,’” reflects the identity the magazine seeks to propagate in the international information space (quoted in Schäffner, 2005, p. 158). Like DW, DS does not define itself as strictly German, but as European and therefore it constitutes part of a rarified level of media aimed at transnational audiences.
**Methodologies**

Rhetorical theory and criticism and critical discourse analysis (CDA), while deriving from separate analytical traditions, have several points of intersection, and are particularly suited to analyzing elite discourse (Kaufer & Hariman, 2008; Tracy, Martínez-Guillelm, Robles, & Casteline, 2011). According to Tracy et al., “[b]oth are centrally interested in political/mediated events, both do close textual analyses, and both eschew neutrality as a desirable stance for authors” (p. 266). The approach outlined here takes CDA as a general approach and uses rhetorical theories of the “people” to mark out the discursive tropes employed by Cameron, DW, and DS respectively.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an approach to textual analysis that comprehends discourse as a social practice, embedded in particular social and institutional structures that shape those structures in turn (Fairclough, 1989, 2009). Discourse carries potential ideological meanings that normalize relations of power as “ideology crystallizes in language,” and, “can appear as if frozen in language” (Holborow, 2007, p. 53). Read in this way, speeches and media texts are made to affect the power dynamics of social and institutional relations and they also negotiate those dynamics to appear natural or commonsensical (Carvalho, 2008). CDA practitioners, therefore, seek to unmask those linguistic features that mask elite power and domination.

In the context of financialization, CDA entails examining the discursive tools, such as metaphor, hyponymy, synecdoche, and narrative, that foster a “culture” of financialized citizenship and governance (Sawyer, 2013). The structural changes of financialization, that is the increased reliance on finance over material production in economic life (Fuchs, 2010a, 2010b; Schiller, 2011), are thus accompanied by discourses that normalize those changes and constitute subjecthood in terms of new governing logics (Lazzarato, 2009; Martin, 2002, 2010). In terms of the EU and the ongoing financial crisis, financialized identity exists alongside rhetorical attempts to constitute Europeanness as such (Beck & Grande, 2007; Kennedy, 2011; Öner, 2011). Financialization of the EU system would therefore be accompanied by rhetorics of Europeanness and Europeans as people, with their shared economy being a function of their identity.

Rhetorical theory views the “people” as, in part, the product of rhetorical action not an intrinsic category to which individuals belong. As McGee (1975) argues, “from a rhetorical perspective, the entire socialization process is nothing but intensive and continual exercises in persuasion: Individuals must be seduced into abandoning their individuality, convinced of their sociality” (p.242). Individuals are fashioned into a people when hailed (Althusser, 2001) and historicized as such (Charland, 1987). Rhetorics like this allow people to, “conceive of a set of individuals as if they were but one,” and, “become identified with ‘community,’” lessening contestation in a given society (Charland, 1987, p. 140). Charland argues that the effect is an “illusion of freedom” that legitimates action on the part of the collective and the elite. By interpellating the individual subject into a collective subjectivity and placing that collective to be, “constituted with a history, motives, and a telos” the rhetor legitimates and enables particular political actions (1987, p. 140 emphasis in original). A people who are fashioned by such rhetoric must then live according to the dictates of the narrative itself. Violating the terms of their collective subject position will reveal the narrative as a construct.
The view adopted here is that the particular version of the EU Cameron articulates in his speech is not only a question of identity, but also one of economic and political interests. Constitutive rhetoric (Charland, 1987) reveals the narratives by which a rhetor constructs subjects, but also the actions they would then be delimited in taking. Those actions, at least in this context, mask ideological interests, just as the press coverage of the speech masks other, even conflicting, ideological interests.

As for DS and DW, some findings should be highlighted before analysis. Like most outlets, both DS and DW use wire service such as AFP, AP, Reuters, and DPA, to supplement the work of staff journalists. These stories usually have no author listed. However, each outlet cites multiple wire services as sources, suggesting that a staff member culls particular details and quotations from the wires and creates a story from them. Second, the search indicates that both DW and DS have very few journalists working this story, apparently no more than seven to eight based on by-lines. In one DW story a DS journalist, Carsten Volkery, is an interview subject (Wallis, 2012). In any given news organization it is normal to have some journalists specialize in a “beat.” But in the context of two outlets whose mission is bring to German/European perspective to a pan-European and transnational audience, this finding indicates an extremely circumscribed number of people in control of that message.

Data Selection

The data set of DW and DS content was developed by conducting searches using both websites’ internal search engines. Traditional sources such Lexis Nexis or ProQuest were judged to be inadequate for the task given their greater focus on newspapers and general lack of complete content for television specifically. An identical search was run for each; “David Cameron” was the search term applied to both outlets, beginning in October of 2012 when a meeting of EU national leaders was held to discuss the seven-year budget of the Union. The reason for this demarcation is that this is the time that Cameron introduces the possibility of a British referendum on EU membership. It is also, therefore, the beginning of press coverage on this particular event, as opposed to the European financial crisis in general. These results were then analyzed for the presence of references to EU summit, the speech, and the proposed referendum. News, opinion, columnist, and editorial content were recovered.

The resulting content was then organized chronologically from October 2012 to March 2013, when news coverage of the speech ceased. Both DS and DW’s press coverage focused on the following events: a nonbinding British Parliamentary vote to cut the EU budget, the banking union summit, the budget summit, and finally Cameron’s speech. Initial analysis indicates that Cameron’s proposed referendum, and then his speech on the referendum, elicited large amounts of commentary and news coverage from both DW and DS. Deeper analysis applies the concepts and theory discussed above (Charland, 1987; Fairclough, 1989, 2009; Holborow, 2007; Kaufer & Hariman, 2008; Tracy et al., 2011).

Analysis

Analyses of both Cameron’s speech, and the German coverage of that speech, reveal certain patterns of tropes and metaphors that last throughout the study period. Both DS and DW’s pre-speech coverage fashion Cameron and his position and actions as motivated by domestic concerns over the good of the EU itself. He is
frequently derided as weak in his own party, and frightened of the rising United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a right-wing group that rose to prominence early in the 2000s thanks to its anti-EU message. Post-speech coverage maintains that pattern and as such it can be deduced that his speech did not have a real effect on the news narratives of DS and DW.

**Cameron’s Speech**

Cameron draws upon the first set of values identified by Kennedy (2011), those related to the free movement of goods and people. Nevertheless, he also draws upon the fourth set of values, equating Europe with “equality and solidarity.” By calling on these two sets of values, Cameron rhetorically constructs the EU as an ideal neoliberal market, where the single market is the core purpose of the Union, and access to it is the ultimate measure of an equal Union, thus foreclosing the possibility of a political Union.

Early in his speech Cameron claims: “We have the character of an island nation: independent, forthright, passionate in defense of our sovereignty” (para 17). Due to this, “sensibility, we come to the European Union with a frame of mind that is more practical than emotional” (para 19). He then claims that the purpose of the EU is no longer to prevent war but to, “secure prosperity. The challenges come not from within this continent but outside it. From the surging economies in the east and south” (Cameron, 2013 paras 9-10). The EU is in “A race for the wealth and jobs of the future” (para 11). In this global race for wealth there is a, “crisis of European competitiveness, as other nations across the world soar ahead” (para 41). The crisis of European competitiveness is, “self-inflicted. Complex rules restricting our labor markets are not some naturally occurring phenomenon” (para 52-53).

Cameron’s narrative positions the EU as economically weaker than its neighbors in a world where competition is the norm and where the EU’s policies are harming its competitiveness. Cameron believes the, “core of the European Union must be, as it is now, the single market” (para 69). He wants, “completing the single market to be our driving mission” (para 71). Promoting the single market means creating a, “leaner, less bureaucratic union, relentlessly focused on helping its member countries to compete” (para 74). He further claims that his views, “reflect the reality of the European Union today” (para 85).

Cameron constructs the EU as purely instrumental and economic by drawing on the market and equality sets of values. Doing so first limits the potential scope of the Union to the economic, not the political, and thus undercuts alternative solutions to the Eurozone crisis, or the overall organization of the EU itself. Second, if the core of the Union is the market, and yet the Union must be fair to its members, then only those actions that improve the functioning of the market are valid. Others, such as wage regulation, labor regulation, access to the European Court of Human Rights, are not the Union’s ambit. It, therefore, cannot be a “liberal moral agent.” Furthermore, the UK has a “practical” and “independent” relationship with the EU. There are three implications that follow from this. If the UK is “practical” then those who disagree with him are impractical or emotional. Second, if Cameron is practical, then the EU as market is also practical. Finally, if Cameron is practical, then pushing the Union to be a strict market that improves national competitiveness is also practical. Charland’s (1987) constitutive rhetoric shows that if the EU is primarily economic and instrumental Cameron’s proposed solutions to reinforce the common market and devolve powers back to national governments, is part of an
inevitable course of action. Therefore, if his audience is interpolated into a collective subjectivity that privileges primarily national identities and an economic EU, that position could not be violated by deeper political integration to solve the crisis.

_Deutsche Welle and Der Spiegel_

There are clear similarities between Deutsche Welle and Der Spiegel’s coverage from the beginning of the period in October 2012 and the period after Cameron’s speech. While DS is harsher and more critical in tone and language, DW is also highly critical of Cameron’s position. The difference between the two is in tone and word choice, not in their respective positions. Before Cameron’s speech, they criticize his domestic weakness and lack of vision and marginalize British Euroskepticism as childish, suggesting a concordance of ideological viewpoints. After his speech, both outlets selected the same quotations and published opinion articles that were both highly critical. Their coverage contains three key parallel tropes. First, they both construct Cameron as a weak leader who, for domestic reasons, is putting the Union in danger with his “stubbornness.” Second, and following from the first, they both denigrate British Euroskepticism as “fringe” or “radical.” The implication is that Cameron is not in control of his own party, and that fringe elements are taking advantage of his weakness. Finally, if Cameron’s position is a result of his weakness and his catering to a fringe element in British politics, then he is only concerned with domestic issues, to the detriment of Europe. Both outlets frequently quote negative opinions of Cameron prior to his speech and negative reactions to it after the speech was delivered, thereby giving the impression of widespread disapproval of his position.

Joanna Impey’s article “UK should ‘make up its mind’ on Europe” leads with the observation that anti-EU rhetoric is on the rise in Britain. Impey states that, “British ‘euroskeptics’ are hoping this will be an opportunity to claw back powers from Brussels” (Impey, 2012a). Impey continues her article with a series of quotes from members of Continental European think tanks, which emphasize that “frustration” between London and Brussels has existed for a long time. She also quotes a British MEP who says, “‘I think people understand that if there’s a harsher tone that’s certainly to be for domestic consumption,’” (quoted in Impey, 2012a). The quotation of the British MEP illustrates the domestic consumption trope, while the scarequotes around euroskeptics illustrate Impey’s marginalization of anti-EU feeling and politics in Britain. Two wire service articles published on the DW website, on the same day, reinforce the view that Cameron’s position is the result of weakness (“British ministers warn EU cuts could isolate the UK,” 2012, “British parliament rejects EU budget, cornering Cameron,” 2012). One article quotes the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, who runs a coalition government with the Conservatives. The articles quotes him saying, “‘you will never achieve (anything) by stamping your foot and saying, Well we want to be part of this club, we want to unilaterally rewrite the rules of the games’” (quoted in “British ministers warn EU cuts could isolate the UK,” 2012). The quote from Clegg, with the phrase, “stamping your foot” ascribes the Tory rebels with childish characteristics, as though they are throwing a tantrum.

DW maintains the domestic weakness and euroskeptics fringe tropes throughout November. Joanna Impey’s article, “Britain’s continental drift away from the EU,” uses quotation, ascription, and word choice to position Cameron as weak and at odds with Europe. Impey notes in the lead that Cameron is “under increasing pressure to act tough on Europe.” She
continues in the next paragraph, “to many in Europe, it may seem as if Britain is already taking a hard line on the EU,” since Cameron had “threatened” to use his veto during the budget negotiations. Impey’s main quotation subject is a Conservative Polish MEP, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, who says, “You cannot be a member of a club, agree to pay the fee, and then after entering the club and having the meal, leave without paying.” (quoted in Impey, 2012b). She characterizes the vote in Parliament on the EU budget as a “humiliating defeat.” Finally, she ascribes to “many in Europe” the feeling that Britain should “make up its mind.” Similarly, to previous articles, Impey constructs Cameron as someone who is beset by hardliners and cannot control them. She also implies that Cameron is childish through the quotation of the Polish MEP.

These tropes are prevalent in other DW journalists’ work throughout November (Hasselbach, 2012; Krause, 2012; Wallis, 2012). For example, Krause observes that several countries want to cut or freeze the EU budget. He then asks, “And the British? David Cameron himself wants to keep the budget as its stands... But for the majority parliamentarians... even that doesn’t go far enough” (2012). Wallis (2012) states that Cameron, “facing accusations that he can’t keep control of his party, perhaps felt he had to promise ‘tough talking,’” at budget negotiations. The language employed by DW journalists separates Britain from other EU nations who want cuts or have threatened vetoes of the budget. These countries are never portrayed as under domestic pressure, or with a weak leader. It is true that Cameron’s desired budget is the strictest, but no other nation is defined by its leader’s weakness in the face of domestic pressure. These tropes are also prevalent in DS, but in a more aggressive form.

Neukirch, Pauly, Scheuermann and Schult’s (2012) article “Europe’s Next Crisis: Britain Losing Allegiance to the EU” repeatedly stresses the uniqueness of Cameron’s policies. For example, the authors contend that Cameron “faces a dilemma” between the Liberal Democrats, and the “right-wing populist” UKIP. At the conclusion the authors intone, “Greece’s financial problems are no longer at the top of their [the EU’s] list,” it has been replaced by possible British withdrawal (Neukirch et al., 2012). In Neukirch et al.’s article, they describe the British position as extreme and driven by extremism in Britain itself. By positioning Cameron within a “dilemma,” the authors reinforce the perception of his weakness.

Several articles (Scheuermann, 2012, 2013b; Volkery, 2012a, 2012b) make an explicit connection between Cameron’s position and domestic weakness and domestic extremism. In, “Britain’s EU wavering: What Cameron doesn’t know could hurt you” the author charges the PM with “diplomatic ineptitude” and calls his position “erratic.” He argues that, “Cameron’s inability to steer the debate in London over the EU shows just how weak the Prime Minister has become within his own party.” He concludes, “Europe lives from the passion of its members and from their willingness to accept responsibility and obligation. Radical egotists who are only half-heartedly engaged have the ability to destroy the entire project” (Scheuermann, 2012). In a January 2013 article, Scheuermann pursues the same line of attack. He declares, “The prime minister has no strategy and has made tactical decisions out of fear of alienating voters,” and this is one reason why, “ranting members of UKIP and rebellious anti-EU members of Cameron’s Conservatives are dominating the political discourse” (Scheuermann, 2013b). Scheuermann’s are the most direct attacks charging him with weakness in his own party, and against extremism. Nevertheless, while this author is more direct, the other authors analyzed
perceive the situation in the same terms. In total, the pre-speech coverage describes a perilous situation for Europe, as the result of Cameron’s “ineptitude” in controlling his own party. That weakness allows UKIP to continue pressuring for a British exit from the EU.

DS and DW’s coverage after Cameron’s speech maintains the patterns seen prior to the speech. However, DW relies on unauthored wire service articles for their reporting on the speech (“Cameron offers Britons EU vote, if they vote for him,” 2013, “EU leaders hit out over Cameron referendum pledge,” 2013) and use a journalist for opinion articles while DS’s Volkery (2013) wrote a news piece on the speech. However, the three articles overlap with their selection of reaction quotes from European leaders. For example, all three quote then German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle saying, “cherry picking is not an option.” Two quote European Parliament President Martin Schulz proclaiming, “Cameron’s European a la Carte is not an option.” All three quote French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius’ view that a referendum would be, “dangerous for Britain.” In short, both DS and DW show a reliance on similar quotation sources, all of whom had negative reactions to Cameron’s speech. Furthermore, the quotes themselves tend to imply that Cameron’s proposal is childish or selfish. Recall the “stamping your feet” from Nick Clegg. The overall implication is that Cameron is an immature leader who either does not know or care about the European Union.

The search found two opinion pieces on the speech during the study period, one each from DS and DW (Impey, 2013; Scheuermann, 2013a). Scheuermann’s piece, “Europe’s Scaredy Cat” leaves little to the imagination. The author contends that Cameron “missed an opportunity” in his speech to move Britain back to the center of European politics. Instead, he assesses that Cameron argued for the referendum, which “isn’t a replacement for a true strategy on Europe. It merely represents an attempt to shake off a troublesome issue by postponing it to a later date.” Scheuermann continues, “Cameron’s vision for Europe is a free trade area with access to the beaches of the Mediterranean. Beyond that he doesn’t associate the project with a past or future.” According to the author Cameron lacks vision because, “his interest in Europe stems from fear rather than any desire to shape it. He’s driven by fear of the euroskeptics in his party, of the voters,” and of UKIP. Scheuermann concedes that the issues Cameron raises in the speech are valid and important, but denigrates the PM’s motives as thoroughly domestic and without concern for consequences.

Impey’s commentary, “‘In-out’ referendum is no real choice,” casts Cameron in a similar light. The author writes, “Of course, the stark in-out choice is to appease those on the right of the Conservative party…. David Cameron is under intense pressure from those within his party who are concerned about” UKIP. Impey continues, “UKIP is threatening to steal votes from the Conservatives at the next election. [UKIP leader] Farage’s rise from derided eccentric to plausible politician has therefore forced… Cameron to move further to the right.” Furthermore, Cameron did not refer to any of the positive aspects of EU membership and so, “The euroskeptics have capitalized on the fear among the British public surrounding the eurozone crisis.” Impey’s commentary, like Scheuermann’s, conveys a feckless and weak Cameron for her readers. She, thus, maintains the pattern seen in previous coverage leading up to the speech and in the coverage after the speech.

Both outlets responded extremely negatively to Cameron’s speech. Both selected negative quotes from European politicians and published negative opinion
pieces. Their coverage fits into a pervasive and long running pattern of marginalizing euroskepticism in the UK. However, polls indicate that anti-EU feeling is at an all-time high, with 59% of Germans not trusting the EU (Jenkins, 2013; Traynor, 2013). Therefore, even if UKIP can be fairly described as fringe, their distrust of the EU is more common than DS and DW coverage allows.

The general uniformity of DS and DW’s coverage could mean that they resort to the same news gathering methods. However, that does not explain the uniformity present in their opinion pieces, or more generally their authored articles. In this sample, there was little if any sympathetic coverage of Cameron’s position. It is important to remember, however, that a multiplicity of voices would be the goal of a truly pan-European public sphere. DW could simply be a part of that multiplicity, but the general lack of research on transnational media in this context makes comparison difficult. Further comparative research is necessary to discern if other outlets provide balance to DS and DW’s consistent coverage.

**Conclusion**

Financialization, as both material and cultural process, has drastic effects on citizens around the world. That said, even as these effects play out in lives, making itself quotidian, financialization is open to contestation from below but also within elite circles. While workers may use actions, such as strikes, walkouts, and protests elite disagreement is sometimes hidden. Therefore, given their particular media diet, analysis of media outlets catering to European and international elites provides a window into the intellectual and discursive resources used by political leaders. The Washington Consensus may have had its time in the elites’ sun, but the 2008 crash has clearly damaged it in myriad ways. Particularly when multinational treaties and supra-national entities like the EU are involved, financialization of markets and culture must negotiate multiple levels of decision-making power.

In the mix of contestation, transnational media play a unique role. Rather than assume that their messages to elites reinscribe hegemonic assumptions of capital, this essay argues that transnational media serve as a site of ideological contestation, all the more so given their recent proliferation. As more nation-states and sub-national groupings enter the international media space scholars can expect to see more media discourse operating outside of national mainstream politics. The increase of these stations present researchers with numerous opportunities to engage with the financialization of discourse at a level that transcends national boundaries and constitutes a global class that, despite appearances, is not united in economic orthodoxy.

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