



Terrorism in Central Asia and Kazakhstan and Information Warfare

Primbetov DS* and Mukashev S

L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, 010000, Astana, Satpayevstreet, 2, Kazakhstan

*Corresponding author: Dauren Sakenovich Primbetov, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, 010000, Astana, Satpayevstreet, 2, Kazakhstan, Tel: +77172359120; E-mail: bolshakov665486@mail.ru

Received date: May 06, 2016; Accepted date: June 07, 2016; Published date: June 11, 2016

Copyright: © 2016, Primbetov DS, et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Citation: Primbetov DS, Mukashev S. Terrorism in Central Asia and Kazakhstan and Information Warfare. Global Media Journal. 2016 S3:22

Abstract

The period from 1990 is a time of complicated change of threats for the Central Asian states. One of the most critical is terrorism. The paper analyses the current situation with terrorism in Central Asian region and focuses on activities of terroristic organizations in Kazakhstan from the obtaining the independence. Using comparative method, the authors estimate efforts of the authority of Central Asian countries. It also provides a brief analysis of the principles of the fight against terrorism, the strong and weak sides of terrorism activities. This article describes the activities of terroristic organizations in Central Asia, forecast and analysis of their actions. Nowadays the term "information warfare" is becoming relevant. Information security plays the main role in antiterrorism policy. The world moves to new type of wars – information warfare. The authors suggest the forms and methods of fighting and the essence of fighting against terrorism. It examines the prospects for solving these problems.

Keywords: Terrorism; Terrorist forces; Politics; Method; Media; Information warfare

Introduction

After disintegration of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in Central Asia the process of disintegration of bureaucratic system of the state started which was accompanied by violation of principles of social justice, and levelling of moral values. Economic trouble, material and social differentiation of population, corruption, low economic level of the countries, rise of prices, late payment of wages, unemployment, lack of means for existence caused a condition of opposition in society in the region.

From the geopolitical point of view, Central Asia represents strategically important region where interests of many parties of the international relations are intersected, whether it is empire of global significance as Russia, China and the USA, or

regional - as Pakistan, India, Iran, and also international the organizations like the UN, NATO, OSCE, SCO, etc.

The Central Asian region is one of the most sensitive areas in the world, and has great potential both for becoming a testing ground for conflict resolution in this "war within Islam" as well as for religiously based conflict generation [1]. Central Asia became a location point for the international terrorism, religious extremism, ethno-national separatism, organized crime, illicit traffic in drugs and weapons, illegal migration.

Method

The main method was comparative analysis and analysis of government documents, expert survey. Comparative analysis of activity of terrorist organizations in Central Asian states security was carried out.

Results

Terrorist forces in the region

The total area of the Central Asian region (CAR) is 4 million sq.km, the population is more than 55 million people. The ethnic composition of the region consists of more than 130 various people and ethnic groups. The CAR borders with Afghanistan (2087 km), Iran (922 km), China (2085 km), Russia (6846 km). The CAR is the only region of the world where all four main world religions are closed: Christianity, Islam, Confucianism and the Buddhism [2].

Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants to obtain political or social objectives through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims [3].

The main terrorist forces in the region:

'Islamic movement of Uzbekistan' operates in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan;

'Hizb of Ut-Tahrir al-Islami' ('Party of Islamic Release') operates in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan;

'Muslim Brotherhood' (JAMA' AT/HARAKAT IKHWAN al - MUSLIMEEN) – groups of this organization represent a

network of the autonomous cells operating under various names. The following presents interests according to the CAR: 'Society of social reforms' (OCP - JAMIAT AL - ISLAH AL - IJTIMAI) has offices in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; 'The committee of an Islamic appeal' (-DAWAA AL - ISLAMIYA) works with LAJNAT AL under the auspices of OCP; 'Daavalslamiyya' is a radical wing of OCP.

'The committee of Muslims of Asia' functions with 'Labban Faundayshn's' support;

'The center of Islamic development' operates in Osh, Kyrgyzstan;

'Akromids' is the religious Islamic trend of Uzbekistan operating in Fergana Valley;

'Adolatyushmasi' ('Adolat Association') is the religious and extremist organization operating in Namangan, Uzbekistan;

'Islom lashkarlari' ('Soldiers of Islam') operates in Uzbekistan;

'Towba' ("Repentance") has supporters and activists in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan;

'Movement of East Turkestan' operates in Xinjiang, China; It has committed a number of acts of terrorism in the CAR states;

'The national revolutionary front of East Turkestan' is the extremist organization pursuing the aim of creation of Uyghur state in the territory of Central Asia states;

'Organization of liberation of Turkmenistan';

'East Turkestan Islamic party' [4].

The main aim of these organizations is in the promotion of ideas of separatism and radical fundamentalism. The connection of terrorist activity of many organizations with the international drug industry makes a significant importance.

The following groups of fighters are the key in Central Asia at present:

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its branch 'Union of Islamic Jihad' (SIJ);

The Islamic Party of Turkestan (IPT) which was known earlier as the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET);

Dzhund al Caliphate (Soldiers of the caliphate);

HizbUt-Tahrir (Liberation party).

In spite of the fact that it is analytically convenient to break Central Asian fighters into the separate groups, many fighters are not identified themselves with any certain group. They are more likely identified with wider network of 'Mujahideen' and at the same time can fight in the structure of any groups, team or cells in a zone of their military operations.

Islamic movement of Uzbekistan' (IMU) and 'The union of Islamic Jihad' (UIJ)

In the late 1990s and early 2000s fighters of IMU were forced out from Uzbekistan as a result of Islam Karimov's force action on Islamic fighters. Retaliatory measures against IMU

and other fighters amplified after their attempt to kill the president Karimov in 1999, and in 2004 they made a series of attacks on American and Israeli objects in Uzbekistan. However, since the middle of 1990s fighters could place bases in Tajikistan, having used instability of the country after civil war of 1992-1997, and to ensure their presence in northern areas of Afghanistan under control of the 'Taliban' [5].

Today IMU and Pakistan's 'Taliban' maintain their relations. Thus Uzbeks force the most impudent attacks on Pakistan security forces. Terroristic attacks at the airport of Peshawar in December 2012 resulted the escape of Adnan Rashid from the Bann prison in April, 2012 who was waiting for capital punishment for president Pervez Musharraf assassination planning in 2003. After the escape Rashid admitted the guilt of conspiring with the purpose to assassinate Musharraf in spite of the fact that for years he denied it, being behind the bars.

SID group ('Group of Islamic Jihad') was founded in 2002 in Southern Waziristan by two ethnic Uzbeks, former fighters of IMU including Abu Yakhya Mahomed Fatikh

(Abu Yahya Muhammad Fatih) known as Nadzhmuddin Dzhahalolov. In contrast to IMU, originating in Namangan in Fergana Valley in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan, SID was created on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the environment of the multinational jihad, declared after act of terrorism on September 11, 2011 where America was defined as the main enemy. Even if Fatikh would like SID to be concentrated on Uzbekistan, initially this group addressed with an appeal to young people and internationally adjusted 'foreign' fighters, including the Tajiks, Kyrgyzs, Kazakhs, Uyghurs, Germans and Turks to enlarge the ranks [6].

In 2013, IMU worked mutually with Pakistan's 'Taliban', sent people as well to northern Afghanistan to help Afghan's 'Taliban'. Counting some thousand members of various nationalities, the movement is rather a small army, than a typical terrorist group, with opportunities from commission terroristic acts to armed invasions into the cities, and especially, into rural areas where it can seize the territory as it happened with the Rasht valley in Tajikistan in the late nineties. The mandate of IMU is more, than simply Pakistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, its aim is the whole 'Turkestan'. Actually, sometimes, according to messages, IMU is also called as 'Islamic movement of Turkestan'.

Islamic party of Turkestan (IPT) (earlier known as IMET - 'Islamic movement of East Turkestan')

From the moment of its creation in 2008, focused on Uyghurs 'The Islamic party of Turkestan' (IPT) swore to carry out jihad against "communistic Chinese invaders" of Xinjiang. Xinjiang is the large western province of China which borders with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and is known to its many Muslim inhabitants, as 'East Turkestan' – the term which is forbidden in China for its separatist implication [7].

In spite of the fact that there is insignificant number of evidences concerning the actual operations of IPT in China, the organization remains sheltered within the training camps in

tribal territories of Pakistan. It tries to reach the big Islamic world through the authoritative glossy online magazine 'Islamic Turkestan' and sophisticated multilingual video propaganda directed on Russian-speaking inhabitants of Central Asia and fighters from Turkey.

It is remarkable that the first two leaders of IDVT and the former leader of IPT Abdoul Shakur al-Turkistani were highly integrated into 'Al-Qaeda' circles, at the same time al-Turkistani served as the commander in 'Al-Qaeda' in tribal territories of Pakistan. The largest attacks of IPT were carried out on July 30-31, 2011 in Kashgar, the province of Xinjiang, China. Attacks started in the evening on July 30, at the moment when the streets were full of pedestrians and grocery stores, visited by Chinese Han ethnic group representatives, the mined car suddenly exploded. Soon after that two Uyghurs stole the truck, killed its driver, and then directed the truck on the sidewalk and grocery stores and chaotically stabbed people with a knife. On July 31 there was one more attack on the popular in Chinese Han Street full of cafes, restaurants and shops. After two explosions in one of the restaurants, ten Uyghurs began to shoot and strike people with knives, including firemen who arrived to rescue victims [7].

'Hizb Ut-Tahrir'

The Hizb Ut-Tahrir group was founded by the Palestinian expat community in 1952 and considers that each Muslim has to work surely in the direction of restoration of the Islamic caliphate and that any other system, except of Sharia law, is not admissible, and that for the Muslim states is haraam (forbidden) to look for protection at America or at any other 'incorrect' (not Islamic) states [8]. Activity of 'Hizb Ut-Tahrir' was restrained in Uzbekistan; in 1990s, it gained popularity at first in Central Asia and in the most part of Kazakhstan, and then arose in Kyrgyzstan, totaling approximately from 20,000 to 100,000 members [9].

'Hizb Ut-Tahrir' started using the Internet for recruitment of new members, putting emphasis on recruitment of youth and women in Central Asia. While the majority of inhabitants of Central Asia do not support 'Hizb Ut-Tahrir', they can respect some of its aims, such as, for example, counteraction of foreign policy of the USA and an appeal to larger economic equality. The same refers to IMU and to other groups of fighters. People can agree with their condemnation of governmental corruption [10].

Dzhund Al Caliphate

The Dzhund Al Caliphate group, or 'Soldiers of the Caliphate', now is based on tribal territories of Pakistan, but, according to messages, has the rifle-pits in the North Caucasus. 'Dzhund al Caliphate' entered the international jihad scene in some months after April, 2011, when Nursultan Nazarbayev won presidential election in Kazakhstan with 95.5 per cent of votes and after that Kazakhstan adopted the disputable law on religion. We will speak about it later.

'Dzhund Al Khalifa' ('Caliphate army') who was created by three Kazakhs, announced themselves in the summer of 2011, having released a series of three videos showing how its

members attacked the forces of the United States in Host, Afghanistan. Attack on the American armies in Afghanistan for this group was some kind of 'the right of pass', or in other words entrance to the community of groups of fighters, before it joined 'Al-Qaeda' [11].

Groups of fighters consider as their enemies the secular governments of all five countries of Central Asia, and also China and Russia, non-Muslims, especially Chinese and Indians whom they consider, as nations without a religion, and Iran – because of their advance of Shiite Islam, which fighters recognize as declension.

Contrary to a popular opinion that 'Dzhund al Caliphate' appeared from nowhere, at the end of the 2000s in the North Caucasus there were signs of presence of the Kazakh groups of the fighters acting together with 'The union of Islamic Jihad' and with other insurgents. The Russian North Caucasus, which includes such unstable regions as Dagestan and Chechnya, is in only 483 kilometers from the western Kazakhstan on that side of the Caspian Sea.

The 'Dzhund Al Caliphate' group also has global ambitions. It follows other Central Asian jihad movements supporting the creation of the Islamic caliphate in Central Asia and greater Islamic world. In 2011 'Dzhund al Caliphate' declared: 'This name ['Dzhund al Caliphate'] reminds Muslims of their debt to revive the Islamic caliphate as system. ... This control system is based on Sharia which has to prevail in each Muslim country from the East to the West ... We believe that the region of Central Asia, in addition to Islamic Maghrib [North Africa] and to Yemen, is the candidate in the future to become the center for return of the state of the Caliphate' [12].

In October 2011, 'Dzhund Al Khalifa' began the first series of attacks in Kazakhstan. Strengthening of terrorist activity in Kazakhstan in 2011-2012 needs deep research, both the reasons of this phenomenon, and its mechanisms. Because until this time acts of terrorism in Kazakhstan were rare, or to be exact, were not executed. Our society has not enough experience of collision with terrorists. It is especially important to understand how terrorism underground functions, relying on analogs and as how it will develop in the next years.

Periodization of activity of terrorist organizations in Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is the active participant of the international anti-terrorist processes in global and regional scales. Cooperation in this sphere is carried out through such authoritative international structures, as the UN, SCO, the CIS, CSTO, and also in a bilateral format. Counteraction to terrorism is one of the directions in ensuring national security of the country; however for many years it remained low-priority and was considered that terrorism will be only external threat.

The well-known political scientist, the secretary of Nur Otan party, and earlier the head of the anti-terrorist center Yerlan Karin allocates the following stages of development of terrorism in the country [13].

'Foreign terrorists' (the end of the 1990s – the beginning of the 2000s). Ten years ago the problem of terrorism for Kazakhstan mostly was connected with the fact that in the territory of the republic could hide fugitive, or so-called 'stranger' terrorists – persons pursued by own states for participation in illegal paramilitary groups. The Kazakhstan intelligence services regularly detained 'foreign terrorists' whom then transferred to the colleagues from other countries.

'Recruiting' (the beginning-the middle of the 2000s years). This period is noted with the increase of cases of involvement and participation of citizens of Kazakhstan in terrorist activity, both in the territory of the adjacent countries, and in foreign countries. The loudest case-elimination by domestic intelligence services terrorist group 'Zhamaat of Mujahideens of Central Asia', responsible for the series of the acts of terrorism organized in the spring-summer of 2004 in Uzbekistan. This group included citizens of Kazakhstan who acted mainly against the authorities of Uzbekistan which, in their opinion, restrain the rights of Muslims [13].

'Local or 'own' terrorists' (2005-2011 years). The number of the Kazakhstan citizens who instituted criminal proceedings for committing crimes, connected with extremism and terrorist activity already within our country grows. So, in particular in 2008-2009, according to official data, 7 acts of terrorism were prevented in the country. Therefore the problem of terrorism once seeming far and virtual, today gains nature of direct threat to the national security. This period is characterized by also sharp increase of cases of participation of Kazakhstan citizens in terrorist activity in the territories of other countries.

It should be noted that since 2011 the new stage has started, that is open opposition of the government and the terrorist underground. Thus the government knew about growth tendency, but it was not ready for it.

One of key questions is – whether the incidents of 2011 should be considered as acts of terrorism or simply as a crime or a social protest?

Act of terrorism is an act of violence for the purpose of intimidation of object or influence on it. Terrorism does not have the aim to benefit or profit; it has a demonstrative character and unlimited violence. It is also possible to rank arrests of groups of terrorists as acts of terrorism, as a rule, they resist to security officers. Besides, act of terrorism is organizationally and technically difficult operation, therefore it often executes unsuccessfully, which should also be fixed [14].

Also terror differs from diversion that can be executed both by organizations and other states. Differences of terror from diversion (in case terror is targeted on the population):

Psychological influence instead of real;

Emphasis on information background instead of infraction of work of economics;

Mass character of victims instead of a choice of the people making decisions.

In this case Maksat Kariyev's example in Taraz is more exhibitively, who after murder of employees of NSC (National

Security Committee) continued murdering and went on attack NSC department's building though he could leave the city quietly and he could not have been caught.

It is necessary to understand also that objects of terrorists in Kazakhstan do not actually refer to the country population, but to authority organs, precisely the Ministry of Internal Affairs and NSC.

During the research 14 acts of terrorism were analyzed which occurred since May 2011. Everything that was before – detentions of groups of terrorists and escapes of prisoners from colonies – is passive and secondary in relation to actions of the government authority organs.

For example: On April 3 in the residential district No. 3 of Almaty fighters of group of a special purpose 'Sunkar' neutralized a group of radical Islamists who executed some serious crimes. During special operation the leader of an organized criminal group Ruzembay Ishimbetov and his accomplice Abdumansur Niyazov were killed. Only the third member of group was alive-Kadyr Kadyrov who appeared before the court in a half of the year. During the attack 11 'Sunkar' fighters suffered and some of them remained disabled for the rest of their life. But Ishimbetov's group did not manage to make any acts of terrorism in relation to the state and was engaged only in robberies and murders.

A number of events (slaughter in Ile-Alatau national park in August 2012, fight in the residential district 'Akselkent' in Almaty on July 30, and also some other murders) were not classified as acts of terrorism because real responsibilities and motivations of participants were unclear. Also there were numerous detentions of terrorist groups, which, however, could not manage to conduct any acts of terrorism.

Reaction of the authorities

For an appreciable period of time the authorities skeptically estimated possibility of acts of terrorism in Kazakhstan. Thus the preventions of experts made in 1990s about possible activation of extremist and terrorist groups and objective circumstances, such as operations in Afghanistan were actually ignored.

Speaking about terrorism as of external and improbable threat, the authorities, obviously, pursued the only aim-not to disturb society that reacts with attention to any threats of safety.

Actually, even after commission of the first acts of terrorism in 2011 (explosion in the NSC department's building in Aktobe and the building of a pre-trial detention center of NSC in Astana) the authorities refused to call the event an act of terrorism. In the followed statements the word 'terrorism' was not used. The term 'suicide bombing' appeared in a case from Aktobe in official statements. Thus the demolition man was not called the suicide bomber.

The case with explosion in Astana the authorities hastened to declare that people died on the spot as a result of car explosion people 'were not connected with extremist groups'.

Thus soon it became known that the name of one of victims was incorrectly determined.

In both cases official adjustments were not released.

For the first time the fact of terrorism was admitted after two explosions in Atyrau at the end of October 2011 when immediately after the criminal case the relevant article of the Criminal code was initiated. Similar reaction followed the act of terrorism in Taraz, and its performer was called the participant of terrorist group and the suicide bomber [15].

At the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012 a number of statements of authorities followed about the need of systematization of fight against terrorism and reinforcement of power structure, questions related to fight against terrorism propaganda and information work of authority structures were also considered.

In the December Message of 2012 the President Nursultan Nazarbayev gave a concrete assignment to the government. He told: 'We have to improve our legislation for the purpose of neutralization of manifestations of religious radicalism and extremism. We have to improve the anti-terrorist legislation also. The state has to stop extremism and radicalism, no matter where they came from' [16].

It resulted with the accepted law 'On changes and additions in some Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning Counteraction to Terrorism' and actions for reforming of law enforcement agencies and intelligence services which promoted improvement of legal base of their activity, an exclusion of duplication of functions. For the first time on the state level early certification of all law enforcement officers is carried out.

William Shughart suggests that terrorism is rooted in the artificial nation-states created during the interwar period and suggests solutions grounded in liberal federalist constitutions and, perhaps, new political maps for the Middle East, Central Asia and other contemporary terrorist homelands [17].

Adopted in the fall of 2011 amendments put restrictions on praying in public places, propaganda of religious communities; narrowed possibilities of missionary activity and considerably strengthened control of the religious organizations by the state.

The law also provided need for re-registration of all religious organizations within one year, till October 25, 2012. According to the ex-head of the Agency for religious affairs created at the end of 2011 Kayrat Lama-Sharif, about 3,000 of 4,500 associations operating in the country successfully passed re-registration [6].

It should be noted that the terroristic underground of Kazakhstan does not represent the uniform organization-rifl-pits are more autonomous and they, apparently, do not receive direct orders -they follow the lead of the fellows.

The ideological centers, training camp, leaders are located outside Kazakhstan. The system of illegal money transfer only has just formed, and fighters are few in numbers.

The main merging of Wahhabis with criminals occurred in prisons. Mass escapes of convicts from colonies in Aktau and Balkhash are vivid example. Owing to lack of work and study in colonies, prisoners are extremely susceptible to religious promotion.

Soon Wahhabis will try to press under themselves the criminal world to get additional financing and to get prepared fighters in their ranks. Considering that the number of Kazakhs and in general ethnic Muslims in jails is very big, Wahhabis can achieve essential success.

Though the state declares communication of terrorists with 'Soldiers of the Caliphate' in Afghanistan, but it seems that much bigger communications Wahhabi underground, especially in the Western Kazakhstan, has with a Wahhabi underground of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and other Russian republics of the North Caucasus.

It is possible even to allocate 2 zones of influence

The Western and the Central Kazakhstan – close connections with the Russian North Caucasus, owing to prevalence of diaspora of Vainakhs and other people from mountainous area.

The southern Kazakhstan, the city of Astana and Almaty – communication with Central Asia, in particular, with Uzbekistan. Many Uzbeks and Tajiks running because of religious prosecutions move exactly here.

It should be noted that the Kazakhstan underground has no communications with Pakistan and Afghanistan, except incidental.

Discussion

In the struggle against terrorism some state governments in Central Asia can be divided into two groups: which choose more or less severe approach [18].

There are many factors that have an influence on society's non-resistance to terrorism.

We can note information distrust as the main reason. Because information warfare can be executed in large levels and as a part of full military actions like network or cyberwars, or as a single method of execution of military acts.

Forceful imposing extraneous purposes and interests clearly shows that information warfare is an actual war and there is no connection with advertising. In this information battlefield starting from media, post office and any other kind of dissemination of information are the military tools. Because true and direct information is only profitable for disseminator side.

Let us consider this problem from evolutionary development side. According to famous American futurologist A. Toffler, despite the fact intensive development of science and technology, their terminology moves only as a waveform. Its first wave called "agrarian revolution" happened ten thousand years ago. It disbanded primitive communal system, and led to

division of labor and forming step-by-step organizational structure. The second wave that started 300 years ago – “industrial revolution” – brought unknown to the world, powerful, tightly grouped, expansive social system [19]. The third wave started in fiftieth years of the last century’s “post-industrial society” connected to the rise of informational technologies that is very useful in the information time.

Every above-mentioned wave has its own economics, social and political institutes, culture, communication tools, also methods and forms of the prosecution of war. T. Czerwinski who researched the connection of wave alteration with alteration of war types says: The wars of “The first wave” were prosecuted for the land, the wars of “the second wave” were devoted to increase productivity of human force, and the wars of “the third wave” are directed to get education and supervise it. If society’s “forms of military actions” fit society’s “forms of shaping prosperity”, then future wars were not limit only with “information warfare” [20].

Nowadays definitions derived from “technological wave” that are used in defining and researching information warfare are not clear, so these terms are explained differently. Without mentioning this, experts do not have one concrete term of expression “information warfare”, also when it appeared and when started to use as information weapon.

Hence what is information warfare and where it derived from? Informational influence happens through all the time. For instance, mythological legends were firstly used as information attack in ancient times. One more example is stories about the severity of Genghis Khan’s army made their enemy to run even before the battle [21]. Necessary ideology and upbringing influenced psychological precepts in course of showing resistance, land protection and inspire to victory. If ancient Greeks (Horatio) “Death for land is sweet”, our batyr Baurzhan Momushuly said: “Go into the fire for the land – you will not burn”.

Civilization’s dependence on information made it weaker. Prompt service and dissemination of information system increased the strength of information weapon several times. Openness of society made an additional impact. Because open society has a lot more information flow than closed one.

American military expert, military air-force colonel Richard Szafranski in his article “A theory of information warfare” said: “The goal of information warfare is to influence to your enemies so they do not know the impact. Successful information action makes a reverse impact to foe’s decisions and actions, put obstacles to their execution. The goal of information attack in operational level is to create obstacles for enemy’s profitable actions. Concord of actions in two levels forces enemies to make mistakes and wrong decisions however helps us to get achieved goals” [22].

Open armed collisions lead to bloodshed, as Szafranski said “the victory in information warfare is to force your enemy to his knees, and limitlessly reign. Information technology today can rule without showing any power and shedding one’s blood” [22].

Also, society will not be able to resist the terrorists depending to the following reasons:

- Absence of trust to state agencies and mass media owing to what people trust hearings more.

- Lack of efficiency in news.

- Weak explanatory work.

- Self-censorship on some subjects.

- Inability to follow elementary safety rules.

- Religious illiteracy.

- Absence of culture of informing about suspicious persons.

- Excessive respect for Islamic preachers without analysis who is standing before them.

- Increase of terrorist activity, that is Wahhabi rifle-pits, has the following signs:

- Settlements with high percentage of new comers and guests.

- High difference in the population income that strengthens social discord.

- Income allows rising slightly above physical survival.

- A large number of the jobless youth, which does not have specialties and did not pass socialization in army and other structures.

- Forecast of development of a situation

- The main tendencies soon for a terrorist underground:

- Final transition to the Dagestan type of terrorism. Probably, terrorists will kill officials, besides security officers.

- Improvement of communications with the North Caucasus, in this case ideological and educational support.

- Search of new sources of financing – control of the ware markets, sale of drugs, racket, thefts. Formation of networks for transfer of money.

- Search of external support and sponsors

- Emergence of a legal wing or in the form of public figures or sympathizing mass media.

- Expansion of a network of rifle-pits.

Conclusion

Counterterrorism policy must curb multiple modes of attack simultaneously, since attack diversity may bolster terrorist group survival [23].

Thus, considering the objective reasons of distribution of religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asia, acceptance of the following measures of prevention is necessary:

- To solve social and economic problems (unemployment problems, raising of a standard of living, improvement of

economic and social situation in depressive areas and so forth);

To block religious extremism and terrorism at an initial stage and not to allow formation and development of its structures;

Not to allow an ideological justification of terror under banners of 'protection of the rights of the nations', 'protection of belief';

To execute special psychological operations of mass media: admiration by terrorists position in mass media is absolutely not admissible, and is considered as criminal [16].

The problems of the states in political, economic, ecological areas cannot be solved by the efforts of only one state. Problems of the region demand from Central Asia states of the former Union and the world community cooperation for the development of these countries and ensuring national and state security.

We should take into consideration the role of regional security institutions in countering terrorism. These regional security organizations include the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) [24].

References

1. Mullerson R (2007) Central Asia. A chessboard and a player in the new great game. Routledge p: 234.
2. Terrorism in the Central Asia (2013) Russian Antiterror web-portal.
3. Walter E, Sandler T (2012) The political economy of terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
4. Weigel G (2009) Faith, reason, and the war against jihadism: a call to action. New York.
5. Breits BG, Mshigeni DS (2004) Terrorism in Context: Race, Religion, Party, and Violent Conflict in Zanzibar. *The American Sociologist*, 35.
6. Svargaman (2012) Terrorism in Central Asia.
7. Shibusov M, Abramov V (2013) Terrorism in Kazakhstan – 2011-2012 years, 2011-2012. Institute of Political Solutions
8. Namatov N Religious extremism in Central Asia.
9. (2013) New mechanisms of counteraction to terrorism.
10. Nazarbayev N (2012) Address by the President of Kazakhstan to the people of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 14.12.2012.
11. Syroyezhkin K (2000) Ordinary terrorism. *Continent* pp: 20-21.
12. Franco GH, Cervantes SL (2002) Islam in the 21st century. Nova Science Publishers
13. Dingley J, Kirk-Smith M (2002) Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 13: 102-128.
14. Silberman IE, Higgins, Dweck CS (2005) Religion and World Change: Violence and Terrorism versus Peace. *Journal of Social Issues*, 61: 761-784.
15. www.365info.kz
16. Tibi (2007) execute special psychological operations of mass media: admiration by terrorists position in mass media is absolutely not admissible, and is considered as criminal
17. Shughart W (2006) An analytical history of terrorism, 1945-2000. *Public choice* 128: 7-39.
18. Omelicheva M (2007) Combating terrorism in Central Asia: explaining differences in states' responses to terror. *Terrorism and Political violence* 19:369-393.
19. Toffler E (1999) Third wave, M. Ast p: 54.
20. Czerwinski TJ (1996) The Third Wave: what the Tofflers never Told You. *Strategic Forum*, N72.
21. Baggaley J (2012) Global Education: From Genghis Khan to Facebook. *Routledge*.
22. <http://www.rususa.com/news/news.asp-nid-30622-catid-2-lang-rus>
23. Gaibulloev, K. and T.Sandler (2013) Determinants of the Demise of Terrorist Organizations. *Southern Economic Journal* 2013, 79: 774-792.
24. Borkoyev B (2013) The Problem of Terrorism in Central Asia and Countering terrorist Activities in Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO's role in regional security since 9/11. 106: 72-79.